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*Assessment of Probable North Vietnamese Military Strategy
over the Next Six Months*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
31 March 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE
MILITARY STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

Overview

1. Hanoi probably intends to engage its main force units in heavy offensive action in the next six months. Some of these units apparently have already begun to launch major attacks. The focus of this effort is likely to be in the rugged western parts of Military Regions (MRs) 1 and 2 in South Vietnam, where large numbers of well-equipped Communist troops are already arrayed. In southern South Vietnam, an expansion of terrorism and guerrilla activity is possible, but extensive Communist main force action seems unlikely unless the Saigon government moves enough of its troops north to MRs 1 and 2 to present Hanoi with an exploitable opportunity.

2. The Communists are also likely to continue the current offensive in northern Laos through the end of the dry season unless they secure the Long Tieng area before then. Southern Laos, by contrast, will probably see only limited activity designed to protect Hanoi's logistic network from any possible ground threat. Extensive main force activity in Cambodia looks unlikely, given the extent to which Communist forces have been retargeted against South Vietnam. In Laos and particularly in Cambodia, however, the Communists are almost certain to increase terrorist activities, especially when they want to unsettle the local government or feel themselves in need of headlines.

Timing

3. In the western highlands of MR 2, substantial evidence indicates that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) intended to launch major attacks earlier than this in 1972. The Communist timetable has almost certainly been upset by US air strikes and by ARVN's preemptive actions on the ground, and such Allied counter-action may delay the enemy still further.

Nonetheless, the present disposition of Communist forces in the western highlands strongly suggests that they are now ready for action. They may simply be holding off the initiation of major attacks until other enemy main force units are also in position in MR 1 and elsewhere.

4. For maximum impact, it is likely that the Communists would in fact like to attack more or less simultaneously in MRs 1 and 2. In MR 2 they still have time before the rains begin in May to mount a major attack against Kontum or Pleiku cities; at the least they would hope to give ARVN a highly visible bloodying. After the rainy season gets under way, they might return the 320th Division to North Vietnam, but it seems just as likely that they will keep their force structure in and near the highlands at something like its present level.

5. Farther north the Communists opened heavy attacks just below the DMZ on 30 March. It is as yet unclear whether this is the beginning of a major offensive. The Communists now have new roads on the east side of the mountains, and they will probably use them to keep on fighting in MR 1 through the summer. In both MRs 1 and 2, they will be trying to bring unprecedentedly heavy firepower to bear on their adversaries. Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the goal of their main force units will be to tie down as many South Vietnamese troops as possible and to test for weaknesses, probably in a fairly cautious way.

A "Spontaneous Uprising?" 25X1C

6. [REDACTED] the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are also still talking to the political and paramilitary components of their apparatus about a "spontaneous uprising" to disrupt the pacification, sometime in the next few months. Our estimates of the strength of these assets -- the local forces, civilian cadres, and non-Communist sympathizers among the South Vietnamese people -- are much softer than those for the Communist main forces. Still, it seems likely that Hanoi will be disappointed if it really is expecting much out of them any time soon. Indeed, if Hanoi insists on fomenting a "spontaneous uprising," it runs the risk of squandering many of these valuable assets as it did in 1968. The Communists will, however, stay on the lookout for favorable opportunities for "people's war" in South Vietnam, and Vietcong local units will launch whatever actions they can to tie down South Vietnamese forces.

7. Broadly speaking the Communists probably have three interrelated objectives in this period: to undermine ARVN's self-confidence and its credibility with the populace, and thereby to reduce the effectiveness of the pacification program; to influence US domestic politics, particularly the

election campaign; and to stimulate pressure in both South Vietnam and the United States for a negotiated settlement on something approaching the Communists' terms. Hanoi may also be harboring grander hopes -- for a military victory so smashing as to undermine the Saigon regime, for instance, or for a significant surge of popular unrest. The Communists probably do not, however, consider such events particularly likely. They almost certainly have ruled out an all-or-nothing operation in 1972 along the lines of the 1968 offensives, and they probably are prepared to live with the possibility that they will achieve no more than fairly modest gains in the next six months.

Enemy Capabilities: Manpower and Disposition of Forces

8. Conscription in North Vietnam has been high over the past year, with large numbers of young men being inducted into the NVA to replace the troops sent to fight beyond the borders of North Vietnam. Thus far this dry season, Hanoi has dispatched about 117,000 infiltrators to the southern war zones. This compares with some 106,200 during the entire dry season last year (1970/71). Since the infiltration flow in most dry seasons has almost ceased by the end of March, we may have seen the bulk of the infiltration this spring already. Infiltrators beginning the trek from the north after March would generally arrive in the south at the end of the campaigning season, and rain comes to the Laos Panhandle in May -- making travel more difficult. Furthermore, combat losses have not been heavy during the dry season campaigning to date, and thus the need for late-season infiltrators as replacements is not great. (This could change, of course, if large-scale military action gets under way in coming weeks.)

9. Dry-season infiltration starts, by destination, compare as follows:

	<u>1970/71</u> <u>(Sep-Jun)</u>	<u>1971/72</u> <u>(Sep-Mar)</u>
GVN MRs 1 and 2		
DMZ-Tri Thien-Hue	6,000	12,000
MR 5	14,000	16,000
B-3 Front	14,500	40,000
GVN MRs 3 and 4 and Cambodia		
COSVN	45,000	35,000
Southern Laos	26,500 <u>a/</u>	14,000
<i>Total</i>	<i>106,200</i>	<i>117,000</i>

a. Includes some units deployed for Lam Son 719.

As the infiltration figures indicate, the NVA threat to MRs 1 and 2 has developed more strongly than to MRs 3 and 4. The estimate for the B-3 Front includes the 320th Division. The figure for the DMZ and the Tri Thien-Hue (TTH) Military Region includes the 324B Division. In addition, the 304th Division is now deploying to western Quang Tri Province, and the 308th Division is located north of the DMZ in a position to enter TTH. These latter two divisions would represent about 15,000 to 20,000 additional combat troops.

308th
not
committed.

10. We estimate that this year's infiltration has provided for an expansion of the VC/NVA combat order of battle (OB) in South Vietnam and Cambodia by about 27,000 men, increasing the combat OB from about 69,000 to 91,000 in South Vietnam and providing for a 5,000-man increase to COSVN's concentration of forces in Cambodia opposite GVN MR 3 (see the table). The remaining 90,000 infiltrators have been used to expand the rear services system in southern Laos and Cambodia and to provide a stock of fillers to offset combat casualties.

should add
12,000 to 15,000
about
91,000

11. It seems clear from the manpower situation that Hanoi has committed a large portion of its military assets this year to the various military fronts outside North Vietnam. As a result of (a) this year's infiltration, (b) the recent unit deployments into South Vietnam, and (c) an earlier expansion of the force structure in northern Laos, there will remain in North Vietnam only 17 regular infantry regiments.⁽¹⁾ This is the smallest reserve force kept at home by Hanoi during any dry season since 1968 when the General Offensive was under way. In addition, there is some question concerning the combat capability of some of these reserve regiments.

12. This willingness of Hanoi to move an increasing proportion of its troops to areas outside North Vietnam has led to some change in the comparative enemy-versus-friendly combat strengths in South Vietnam. As can be seen from the following tabulation, GVN Main Forces still enjoy superiority in all Military Regions, but that superiority is significantly greater in MRs 3 and 4 than in MRs 1 and 2.

1. This assumes that the 308th Division, which is still in North Vietnam, is committed to redeploy to South Vietnam.

As of 31 March	Main Force Ratios (Allied to VC/NVA) <u>a/</u>					South Vietnam
	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4		
1968	2.4	3.3	3.9	2.4		2.9
1970	2.5	7.0	4.5	8.3		4.2
1972	1.9	2.4	19.5 (3.3) <u>b/</u>	7.4 (4.6) <u>b/</u>		3.7 (2.8) <u>b/</u>

a. These figures, based on CIA analysis, are a ratio of aggregate maneuver battalion strength. They include US forces for 1968 and 1970 only, and in 1972 they include the GVN's Regional Force battalions. The ratios also reflect a maximum first quarter NVA buildup concept, including in 1972 the 308th Division. The ARVN side of the ratio for MRs 1 and 2 also includes the planned deployment of the remaining Marine and Airborne units out of the reserves.

b. The figures in parentheses result from the inclusion of COSVN's 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions, which are targeted against South Vietnam but are presently in Cambodia near the GVN MR 3 border, and the 1st Division which has moved opposite GVN MR 4.

13. To the extent that Hanoi's strategy considerations are based on its manpower commitments (and its judgments regarding Allied strengths), MRs 1 and 2 continue to seem the most likely candidates for enemy-initiated sustained offensive action. Given the existing force ratio situation, if the NVA should launch such an offensive, fighting would be heavy and casualties high. Casualties would be particularly high for the NVA, however, which is the offensive force and which is highly vulnerable - when its units are concentrated - to Allied firepower. Although local situations might develop that appear desperate, the South Vietnamese forces in MRs 1 and 2 should be capable of protecting themselves and the populated areas of the region and of retaking any key objectives lost in the opening round of NVA attacks. (This assessment is consistent with the views held by most senior South Vietnamese commanders.)

14. Hanoi's military strategy in Cambodia is closely related to its strategy in the southern half of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese in Cambodia have attempted to create a situation in which Khmer Communist units, along with certain newly developed light territorial-type

Estimated Strength of Communist Regular
 Combat Forces in Indochina

	Thousand			
	<u>December 1969</u>	<u>December 1970</u>	<u>December 1971</u>	<u>March 1972</u>
VC/NVA	<u>130-150</u>	<u>105-120</u>	<u>105-120</u>	<u>140-155</u>
South Viet- nam <u>a/</u>	130-150	85-95	80-90	110-120
Cambodia	--	20-25	25-30	30-35
Khmer Com- munist	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>10-20</u>	<u>15-30</u>	<u>15-30</u>
PL/NVA <u>b/</u>	<u>55-65</u>	<u>60-70</u>	<u>70-85</u>	<u>70-85</u>
Northern Laos	35-40	30-35	40-45	40-45
Southern Laos	20-25	30-35	30-40	30-40

a. Figures for South Vietnam include those NVA forces located in southern North Vietnam between Dong Hoi and the DMZ which are considered to be a threat to South Vietnam. These forces numbered 13,000 in December 1969, 10,000 in December 1970, 12,000 in December 1971, and 20,000 in March 1972. The figure for South Vietnam for 1969 includes some forces actually stationed in Cambodia but targeted against South Vietnam.

b. Includes troops engaged in antiaircraft support activities.

NVA regiments, are strong enough on their own to hamstring the Cambodian army. If successful, this would free regular North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units to put pressure on GVN MRs 3 and 4. Hanoi's objective is to tie down as many GVN forces in MRs 3 and 4 as possible. Hanoi will doubtless also seek to expand terrorist and sapper activity to the extent possible in both Cambodia and South Vietnam in furtherance of this objective. Given the ratio of opposing main forces, however, it is unlikely that the VC/NVA can bring off any striking successes in southern South Vietnam in the next six months.

15. Hanoi also sharply increased its commitment of forces to the war in northern Laos this season. Heavy deployment toward the end of 1971 included the introduction of three infantry regiments, improvements in the air defense system, and increases in heavy artillery. By the end of 1971, the NVA enjoyed a combat force superiority of about 2.5 to 1 over the Laos irregulars and Thai and Laos regular army personnel in the Plaine des Jarres area. Since then, the combat force ratio has been improved by the movement of additional irregulars and Thais into the area.

16. Hanoi's intention this season was to secure the Plaine des Jarres area by taking friendly strong points to the southwest, including Long Tieng, and to destroy the remaining effectiveness of Vang Pao's army. However, Vang Pao's efforts, with heavy air and artillery support, have delayed the North Vietnamese attack. The growing participation of Thai troops was probably one factor in Hanoi's decision to try for a major breakthrough in northern Laos this year. At this point, it is not clear whether NVA forces have steam enough to complete the job of taking Long Tieng and associated areas. Because it is now late in the dry season, the fall of Long Tieng would not, in the absence of other military or political events, spark a major political crisis within the Royal Lao government.

The Air Threat

17. North Vietnam has only a limited offensive air capability, given a continuation of US air presence in Indochina. Nevertheless, its air force could present an increasing threat to Allied forces over the next six months and in some circumstances could become a significant element in the military balance of power. North Vietnam has about 250 MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-19, and MIG-21 jet fighters. Although these aircraft have been used exclusively in a defensive role against US aircraft, they could be converted and used in a tactical support role with little trouble.

18. The current level of North Vietnamese air activity, coupled with the construction of two new airfields in the far southern Panhandle, strongly suggests that Hanoi plans to utilize its air force in the war more fully in

the future than it has in the past. For the near term, Hanoi has three options which it can exercise while US air power remains in Southeast Asia: (1) increase MIG response to Allied aircraft interdicting the enemy supply effort in both northern and southern Laos, (2) provide ground support to enemy forces in Laos and northern South Vietnam, and (3) use its aircraft in an interception role against Allied aircraft providing ground support to ARVN.

19. The commitment of multiple fighter sorties against Allied aircraft in Laos, staging from five bases south of the 19th parallel and Bai Thuong at the 20th parallel, would increase the threat to Allied air operations. SAM and AAA units now in place are available to provide cover for enemy aircraft operations. By concentrating training efforts on ground attack during the next several months, the North Vietnamese could balance out their air threat to include tactical support to their ground forces. Using the southern bases, this threat would be positioned within striking range of targets in Laos, and, equally important, in South Vietnam.

20. North Vietnamese MIGs do not necessarily have to engage US aircraft to have a significant impact on our ability effectively to support friendly forces. The MIG intrusions into Laos have frequently caused us to divert bombers and gunships away from primary targets. Hence, the use of MIGs over northern South Vietnam could, depending on the US response, cause a drop in our effectiveness in helping the South Vietnamese ward off Communist ground attacks. North Vietnamese MIGs were used in this way over northern Laos during the heavy fighting that took place there last winter, and the penetration of northern South Vietnam by a MIG-21 on 30 March suggests that MIGs may be used in a similar role in this area.

21. One factor which would initially limit the size of operations by Hanoi is its tactical doctrine calling for positive ground radar control of all fighter activities, and the apparent inability of North Vietnam's GCI controllers to direct more than one to two flights simultaneously. The principle deterrent to large-scale North Vietnamese air operations in 1972, however, remains the threat of US retaliation.

Enemy Logistics

22. The overall picture of the Communists' logistical activity during the past several months matches that of their military manpower commitment. Unusually heavy levels of resupply have been detected in southern Laos and along the Cambodian and South Vietnam frontiers -- particularly the borders of MRs 1 and 2. In northern Laos the enemy's

offensive, now several months along, continues to receive substantial logistics support.

23. Currently, supply stockpiles in North Vietnam are extensive. Petroleum stocks in southern North Vietnam may be as high as 45,000 short tons, substantially higher than the enemy's entire dry season petroleum requirement in southern Laos. The current inventory of trucks is the highest ever. Logistics-related construction continues to complement the buildup in stocks in North Vietnam. For example, new construction is under way extending the railroad south of Vinh to within a few miles of Mu Gia Pass, and on a new pipeline to connect Hanoi with the pipeline systems in the North Vietnamese and Laotian Panhandles.

Supply Movements This Dry Season

24. The Communist's annual dry season General Transportation Offensive in southern Laos got into high gear in early January and has continued unabated to the present.⁽²⁾ Facilitated by a considerable road construction effort and restructured logistic apparatus, large quantities of supplies have been moved from North Vietnam through the Laos Panhandle into Cambodia and South Vietnam. A new road system has been built through the central Laos Panhandle; more than 100 miles of new roads are being constructed in northeastern Cambodia; new roads are under construction through the DMZ into South Vietnam; and a series of new roads is being built south of the tri-border area, presumably to support troop deployments in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.

25. The level of logistic activity noted in the southernmost part of the Laos Panhandle has been particularly impressive this dry season. For example, as the General Transportation Offensive began in January, Binh Tram 35 in the Ban Bac area reportedly delivered some 3,500 tons (an average of 113 short tons per day - STPD) of supplies during the month -- probably the largest monthly total ever detected moving that far south.⁽³⁾ Besides these heavy southward deliveries, large quantities of supplies also have been detected moving eastward toward South Vietnam. Binh Tram 42 reported the delivery of 102 STPD to GVN MR 1 on seven days in late

2. The area has now entered the transitional weather phase preceding the rainy southwest monsoon season which starts usually in May. Thus far, however, weather has not yet affected the road system which remains in generally excellent condition.

3. Previous record levels of supply deliveries in the southern Panhandle were reached during February and March of 1970 when Binh Tram 35 reported receiving an average of 107 STPD of supplies. Comparing the two, the 113 STPD figure for January 1972 represents Binh Tram 35's deliveries farther south (not receipts from the north) well before the normal peak levels of activity in February-March.

January. Similarly, Binh Tram 37 revealed an average supply flow of some 64 STPD to the B-3 Front in early February, while at the same time maintaining a significant flow of supplies south to Binh Trams in northeastern Cambodia. A northward flow of supplies – chiefly rice – has also been maintained in the tri-border area. The rice is delivered through the northern Cambodia logistical network to Binh Tram 37, which distributes it among units in the southern part of the Panhandle and also moves it to the east along supply routes to South Vietnam.

26. Massive quantities of arms and ammunition have been included in the detected supply deliveries. For example, Binh Tram 45 shipped some 2,800 tons of ordnance to Binh Tram 46 along the new central road system during February. The shipments included virtually every category of weapon and ammunition known to be in the North Vietnamese inventory and represent the largest monthly shipment of munitions ever noted in COMINT in southern Laos. This high level of activity along the central corridor has continued into March. A summary report for the period 1-12 March indicated that 1,650 tons of supplies – roughly half arms and ammunition – were moved between Binh Trams 45 and 46.

27. This heavy supply activity in the southern Panhandle has had a dual impact. First, activity on the exit corridors has resulted in supply throughput to South Vietnam and Cambodia this season being considerably higher than that of last year at this time. Second, this performance has allowed the Communists to augment their stockpiles of supplies, particularly of arms and ammunition.⁽⁴⁾

4. While throughput has been at high levels, one anomaly exists in the intelligence available for evaluating the dry season effort. The level of supply input into southern Laos as detected by sensors is running well below that recorded last year. Several factors could explain this:

- Resupply requirements may be considerably smaller this year than last when the enemy was building very large supply stockpiles in anticipation of and defense against the ARVN operations.
- Required inputs from North Vietnam may be lower this year because of concentrated efforts by the Communists to achieve greater self-sufficiency in rice in southern Laos and northern South Vietnam. Supplementing this is a probable increased flow of rice from Cambodia to southern Laos and South Vietnam, a flow which should conceptually be considered "input".
- The extensive expansion of the southern Laos and Cambodian logistic system probably required levels of supply input which are currently unnecessary. With that system now operating more efficiently it presumably requires less input from the north for its own consumption. (Footnote continued on p.11)

Northeast Cambodia

28. Resupply activity in northeast Cambodia this dry season has tracked closely with that in southern Laos. Traffic levels on the overland corridor (Route 110/97) increased markedly in January and by mid-February had surged to moderate rates between the border and Stung Treng. South of Stung Treng, sizable volumes of supplies have continued to be shipped southward via the Mekong and Route 13 to Kratie, thence to enemy strongholds on either side of the Mekong. At the same time, the Communists have sustained a flow of rice and gasoline north for consumption by enemy forces in northeast Cambodia, the southern part of the Laos Panhandle, and the B-3 Front area of South Vietnam. Concurrent with the large troop buildup in the B-3 Front area, enemy engineers have constructed a series of new motorable roads and related facilities in the area. The latest reports from aerial observers reveal that the roadnet will apparently link Base Areas 609 and 702 and also will provide a direct link to the Stung Treng military complex.

25X1C

29. This dry season the VC/NVA have also reoccupied, rebuilt, and restocked their former base areas along the Cambodian border opposite GVN MRs 3 and 4. [REDACTED] recent prisoner-of-war interrogations reveal that large quantities of munitions and other supplies have been moved into these areas from Kratie, Chup, Dambe, and O Reang Au. Reports of enemy supply shipments along established LOCs leading across the border into the Saigon area also have become more frequent.

Northern Laos

30. The Communist dry season supply effort in northern Laos got into full swing well ahead of that in the Laos Panhandle. By September, extensive road work was under way and some resupply activity apparent, and by early November very large quantities of supplies -- particularly arms and ammunition -- were on their way to Communist forces who would launch the Communist dry season offensive in the Plaine des Jarres area. The results of this effort have been impressive: an evaluation of intercepted enemy communications suggests that the North Vietnamese have delivered more supplies this dry season than ever before during a comparable period. Although the pace of supply activity has now slowed from its peak period

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- The Communists may be moving large quantities of supplies stockpiled in the northern and central Panhandle last year forward toward South Vietnam and Cambodia this year.
 - Finally, our sensor data on input may understate the actual level of vehicle activity.

of November through January, there is evidence that significant deliveries -- possibly including 40 to 50 STPD of ammunition -- have continued over the past two months.

31. While continuing a high level of supply deliveries, the Communists also have greatly upgraded their logistical and tactical capability in northern Laos by constructing a major new supply route west of the Plaine des Jarres. Now motorable to within a few miles of the Long Tieng Valley, this road gives the Communists for the first time a motorable supply route by which to supply forces west of the Plaine. Through its use the Communist posture for pressing the assault on the Long Tieng complex is greatly enhanced.

Outlook for the Wet Season

32. Overall, the Communists' current logistical posture appears to be in its best shape of the past two years: their stockpiles -- especially of arms and ammunition -- appear sizable; their route structure has gained further redundancy and capability; and they are capable of supporting a record level of rainy season activity, both across the DMZ and in the Laos/Cambodia border area. Finally, these developments will give them a stronger logistics posture in the early stages of the 1972/73 dry season than they had this dry season.

33. All signs indicate that the Communists will sustain a relatively high level of logistic activity over the next two months. By June, however, the seasonal monsoons will affect the road network in southern Laos and Cambodia and the level of activity will be sharply curtailed. During the summer, when rains are heaviest, the focus of activity throughout most of the Panhandle will be on local logistical activity.


34. Some resupply into South Vietnam and Cambodia will occur, however. Mid-March photography has shown that the new Route 103/6086 structure through the DMZ can support vehicle traffic as far south as Khe Sanh. During the rainy season in Laos this route, as well as two others extending into the DMZ, is shielded by the mountains along the western DMZ boundary, which effectively block most of the rain. Thus these roads give the Communists the ability to move supplies directly into MR 1 from North Vietnam. In the Laos/Cambodia border area the Communists' rainy season effort is facilitated by their use of waterways. During last year's rainy season, the Communists relied heavily on these to deliver substantial quantities of arms and ammunition south into Cambodia and equally large quantities of rice (and some petroleum) north into the Laos Panhandle for consumption there or eastward delivery to South Vietnam.


35. In sum, from the viewpoint of logistics, the Communists are now in a fairly favorable position in most parts of Indochina -- in GVN MRs 1

and 2, in Laos, and in Cambodia. Assuming other factors provide no hindrance, they have the supplies to sustain extensive combat activities in each of these areas.

36. In MR 3 and MR 4 of South Vietnam, the logistics situation of the Communists is less rosy. The enemy's problems in MR 3 are substantial, but perhaps less troublesome to him than a year ago. Despite ARVN pre-emptive operations in Cambodian areas adjacent to GVN MR 3, the Communists have had some success in sustaining small but steady supply flows into Tay Ninh Province and points farther south. Several large caches, principally foodstuffs, were seized in northwest MR 3 early this year. These seizures provided limited evidence of enemy intentions to stockpile for future operations. More recent intelligence has indicated Communist intentions to strengthen their logistics position in the subregions around Saigon in anticipation of heightened military activity, possibly during the third and fourth quarters this year. The enemy will face many difficulties in implementing these measures, but some supply flows continue to be detected moving across the border, and the enemy's efforts to strengthen his supply lines clearly continue.

37. The Communists face their most difficult problems, in terms of supplies, in MR 4. The recent surge in enemy sea infiltration attempts (15 this dry season, eight since January) attests to Communist resupply difficulties. Enemy forces in the Delta do have an overland supply link to Cambodia, but deliveries over this route must be considerably less than desired, given the magnitude of the sea infiltration effort. Judging by the Communists' logistics problems, we do not foresee any significant threat from enemy main forces in this area over the next six months, although attention-getting terrorist and sapper activities are always possible.






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